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Abstract The aim of our special issue is to deepen our
understanding of the role moral emotions play in organi-
sations as part of a wider discourse on organisational ethics
and morality. Unethical workplace behaviours can have
far-reaching consequences—job losses, risks to life and
health, psychological damage to individuals and groups,
social injustice and exploitation and even environmental
devastation. Consequently, determining how and why
ethical transgressions occur with surprising regularity,
despite the inhibiting influence of moral emotions, has
considerable theoretical and practical significance to
management scholars and managers alike. In this intro-
duction, we present some of the core arguments in the field;
notably, the effect of organisational life and bureaucracy
on emotions, in general, and moral emotions, in particular;
the moral standing of leaders, managers and followers;
moral challenges raised by obedience and resistance to
organisational power and ethical blindspots induced by
what may appear as deeply moral emotions. These issues
are explored by a collection of geographically diverse
articles in various work contexts, which are thematically
organised in terms of (i) moral emotions, ethical behaviour
and social pressure, (ii) moral emotions and their conse-
quences within/across levels of analysis, (iii) psychoana-
lytic perspectives on the management of moral emotions,
(iv) virtue and moral emotions and (v) moral emotions and
action tendencies. We end by suggesting certain avenues
for future research in the hope that the endeavour initiated
here will inspire improved practice at work.
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Introduction
Do moral emotions and ethical behaviour matter in today’s
organisations? If we subscribe to Nietzsche’s view of
morality as being ‘‘a weapon of the weak to bring everyone
to the same level’’ (cited in Solomon 2007, p. 36), then we
would have to answer that question in the negative. Con-
trary to Nietzsche’s unashamedly elitist perspective, how-
ever, many contemporary discourses addressing
organisational failures seek to bring ethics and, in partic-
ular, moral emotions back into the argument. Serious cases
of care abuse and neglect in the UK’s National Health
Service (NHS), the VW emission scandal, the decades-long
cover-up of sexual abuse by respected institutions (e.g. the
BBC and Catholic Church) and a wide range of routine
banking malpractices which emerged before (and since) the
2008 crisis have all been linked to ethical failures and,
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individual and collective decision-making processes.1 For
instance, a deficit of compassion is linked to organisations
failing their duty of care towards constituents (Fotaki 2015;
Frost et al. 2000; Rynes et al. 2012), while an inability of
perpetrators to experience shame or guilt following
oppressive acts of workplace bullying, humiliation and
discrimination are seen as contributing to a wide range of
organisational malfeasance (Walker and Jackson 2016).
That inability goes straight to the heart of this special issue:
why do ethical transgressions (such as those already
mentioned) ‘‘occur with surprising regularity despite strong
inhibitors and social norms that emanate from personal and
public shame’’ (Murphy and Kiffin-Petersen 2016)?
But this concern illuminates only part of the bigger
picture. These on-going occurrences also raise significant
questions about each organisation’s ability to accomplish
its own mission goals, and beyond that, to contribute to the
wider betterment of society. As we elaborate here, morality
reflects a concern for others (beyond one’s personal or
class interests). Seen in this light, we ask what the role of
moral emotions is vis-a`-vis how we organise ourselves
around a common purpose (Holt and den Hond 2013; Inglis
2015) if the very notion of a common purpose or a common
good is increasingly being questioned2? Thus, it is imper-
ative both to examine what factors influence ethical chal-
lenges, transgressions and failures and to explore how these
contraventions lead us astray from the ‘moral endpoints’ of
our actions (Durkheim 1893/2014; Mill 1861/2001; Solo-
mon 1993a). In consequence, the main purpose of this
special issue is to deepen our understanding of the role of
moral emotions in organisations as part of the wider dis-
courses on organisational ethics and morality.
As a general approach, we present here some core
arguments and perspectives in the field and then synthesise
these with the articles constituting the corpus of this special
issue, the reason being that an introduction to a special
issue can accomplish more than present a summary of its
articles (Brown et al. 2009; Lindebaum and Jordan 2014).
Specifically, our introduction first defines moral emotions
and examines their relation to ethical and unethical
organisational behaviour. We then take our discussion to
the realm of bureaucracy and organisation, and examine
how moral emotions and ethical behaviour affect organi-
sations both in terms of its processes and outcomes,
including claims that organisations neutralise moral emo-
tions and make individuals indifferent to the suffering of
others. We consider the unique position of managers and
leaders, as organisational agents, including the higher
moral profile of leadership, at least through the eyes of
followers, and consider how key organisational figures may
embody—or fail to embody—a caring attitude towards
those in their stewardship. We conclude by coming full
circle to examine the argument that organisation and
bureaucracy, far from being enemies of morality, can be its
defenders—protecting individuals from nepotism, dis-
crimination and even persecution. Following a review of
our featured articles from geographically diverse regions
and various work contexts, we also offer several avenues
for future research beyond the insightful and thought-pro-
voking ones offered in each article of this special issue.
Moral Emotions and Morality
Suddaby (2010) observes that ‘‘just as constructs are the
building blocks of strong theory, clear and accurate terms
are the fundament of strong constructs’’ (p. 347). There-
fore, we define the constructs of central concern here,
starting with emotion as ‘‘a response to a stimulus where
individuals experience a feeling state and physiological
changes, with downstream consequences’’ (Elfenbein
2007, p. 317). Emotions inform, as Zajonc (1980) reminds
us, our value judgments that lead to approach or avoidance
decisions and actions. More specifically, we draw upon
Haidt’s (2003) definition of moral emotions as emotions
‘‘that go beyond the direct interests of the self’’, meaning
they are ‘‘linked to the interests or welfare either of society
as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or
agent’’ (p. 853, italics added). This view of moral emotions
1 To take only the NHS and VW as relevant examples here, we note
that according to the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public
Inquiry Report of February 2013, tens of thousands of vulnerable and
elderly care patients felt at risk from abuse and often go hungry and
unwashed in terms of the former. The report concluded this was the
‘‘the worst crisis any district general hospital in the NHS can ever
have known’’ (p. 47, taken from https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/279124/0947.pdf,
accessed on 15th March 2016). In terms of VW, as reported in the
Sueddeustche Zeitung on 8 November 2015, the engineers seemingly
manipulated the software that measured the CO2 emotions because
they were fearful of the then CEO, Martin Winterkorn. As a result of
the emission scandal (e.g. catering for anticipated repair costs), the
company reported recently its first net loss in 15 years as highlighted
in the Financial Times (see (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4f464ec-
7d45-11e5-98fb-5a6d4728f74e.html#axzz40EWYd2uS, accessed on
15th March 2016). Share prices also declined almost 35 % by October
2015 since the US regulators revealed the cheating in September
2015. If this financial turmoil should lead to future redundancies, the
VW scandal is likely to gain an unequivocal moral dimension.
2 Examples provided previously (e.g. the NHS) emphasise that the
principle of the ‘common good’ is undermined by organisational
malpractice. However, threats to the principle of the common good
can just as well be observed in political commentaries. Fred Inglis
(2015) notes that current thinking (among academics) ‘‘is directed
towards keeping faith with the morally local scale of common
decency, while acknowledging…the steady corruption of public life
and the disappearance from the language of our ruling class of any
conception of the common good. When the prime minister writes… of
Britain as a ‘‘bloated, high-taxing welfare-heavy nation’’, he speaks,
as the very rich and powerful mostly do, in complete disregard of the
obligations of the State towards all its members’’ (p. 44).
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is consistent with the broader term, morality, seen as an
‘‘interlocking sets of values, practices, institutions, and
evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to
suppress or regulate selfishness and make social life pos-
sible’’ (Haidt 2008, p. 70). Thus, whether directly or
indirectly, moral emotions such as anger, regret, shame,
guilt, embarrassment and even Schadenfreude (see Das-
borough and Harvey 2016; Walker and Jackson 2016)
entail some appraisal or perception of a situation linked to
the interests of others, dictating specific courses of action.
This is a key consideration, since even a discrete
emotion can be prompted by many different factors and
may, correspondingly, engender multiple action tenden-
cies. This holds true for sadness (Gray et al. 2011) and
anger (Lindebaum and Gabriel 2015) to name only two
basic emotions. For example, moral anger can be viewed as
a specific type of anger, highlighting theoretical links
among the appraisal of an event as morally unacceptable,
the action tendency that follows from it and the intended
outcome to put right a moral wrong. Thus, Lindebaum and
Geddes (2015, p. 6) define moral anger as ‘‘(i) an aroused
emotional state stemming from (ii) a primary appraisal of a
moral standard violation that (iii) impacts others more than
oneself and (iv) prompts corrective behavior intended to
improve the social condition, even in the face of significant
personal risk’’ (p. 6). In this way, moral anger over injus-
tices or improprieties at work can provoke organisational
members to confront an offending agent or approach those
able to redress a problematic situation for the benefit of
others (Geddes and Callister 2007; Geddes and Stickney
2011; Stickney and Geddes 2016).
A concern for others is viewed as necessary for the very
existence of society (Durkheim 1893/2014; Mill 1861/
2001; Solomon 1993a). From this vantage point and con-
sistent with Haidt (2008), we embrace a social functional
perspective, where morality and moral emotions ultimately
suppress selfishness and promote caring, cooperative atti-
tudes and behaviours.3 This view reflects a long tradition in
sociology where:
It is impossible for men to live together and be in
regular contact with one another without their
acquiring some feeling for the totality which they
constitute through having united together, without
their becoming attached to it, concerning themselves
with its interests and taking it into account in their
behavior. And this attachment to something that
transcends the individual, this subordination of the
particular to the general interest, is the very well-
spring of all moral activity (Durkheim 1893/2014,
p. 18).
The concept of care (Fu¨rsorge in German) plays a central
part in sociology, including Heidegger’s philosophy
(Tomkins and Eatough 2014), and lies at the heart of
Gilligan’s (1982) pioneering work that established ‘ethics
of care’ as a distinct field of both moral philosophy and
moral psychology. In contrast to ‘ethics of justice’, ethics
of care theorists argue for a different system of morality,
one that does not rely on claims of universality, absolute
judgments of right and wrong, and perfect virtues. Instead,
they propose a practical morality that grows out of a
recognition that every individual is embedded in complex
webs of social relations, depending upon others for their
survival and well-being, and capable of supporting others
in their moments of need and helplessness. Moral emotions
are essential in sustaining these networks and supporting
the needs of others to whom we feel close and for whom
we are prepared or expected to take responsibility. Caring
is not a scripted performance or the manufactured smile of
‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild 1983), but involves a wide
range of emotions, actions and concerns that grow out of
emotional sensitivity and empathy towards the needs of
those within our realm of influence (Gabriel 2008a).
Moral Emotions and Ethical Organisation
When looking at ethical behaviour and moral emotions
from an organisational perspective, a number of intriguing
issues arise. We approach organisation both as a process of
maintaining or restoring a certain type of order, and also as
a special type of social collectivity that places moral
demands on its members distinct from those posed by one’s
family, community or nation. Organisation, as a phe-
nomenon, describes a particular type of social order—one
that can characterise the functioning of any social group-
ing, long-term or short-term, with accomplishing collective
aims and purposes, while complying with wider social
codes and values (Ahrne and Brunsson 2010). Neverthe-
less, most contemporary forms of organisation entail a
degree of bureaucratic impersonality that impacts their
members’ moral compass. In the interesting case of the
NHS’s zero tolerance policy for ‘‘verbal abuse’’ towards its
employees, care givers are charged with the responsibility
of possibly withholding necessary medical attention, if
their patient’s (or patient family members’) words or
intensity exceed ‘appropriate’ levels.4 As Solomon (1993a)
notes, our over-emphasis on rules and results can
3 Solomon (2007) offers the germane observation that ‘‘[we] tend to
be selfish and act in [our] own self-interest (to the obvious detriment
of others) only when [we] are taught or forced to do so, by an
excessive emphasis on competition to the detriment of co-operation’’
(p. 29).
4 See, for example, this website: http://www.westpoint-gp.nhs.uk/
info.aspx?p=9 accessed on 14th of March 2016.
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undermine the nature of our ordinary moral judgments. In
these circumstances, moral emotions can be blunted or
muted so that the application of impersonal rules to
accomplish organisational objectives takes precedence
over social and ethical values and norms. This is the view
of organisation sine ira et studio handed down to us by
Max Weber and his successors, which Fineman (1993)
describes as emotionally anorexic.
Emotions, including moral emotions, may be suppressed
in an organisation, although they may be far from absent.
In fact, many organisations commandeer employee emo-
tions for their own ends, requisitioning emotional labour to
achieve company objectives (Hochschild 1983; Lindebaum
2012). This instrumental and compensated deployment of
emotion in organisations, however, can further exacerbate
moral blindspots. Displaying prescribed emotions to defuse
the anger of an irate customer or evict a tenant from his or
her home, or fabricated emotions to ingratiate oneself to a
superior are unlikely to enhance an organisation’s moral
climate. If anything, such actions debase the ability of
moral emotions to govern and inhibit anti-social impulses.
It is for these reasons that Bauman (1989), interpreting
Nazi party barbarism, argued that bureaucratic ethics instil
an unprecedented sense of indifference to the well-being
and the suffering of other people and provide a moral
amnesty for highly questionable practices that demonstrate
‘following orders’. We learn from history that ‘‘the most
terrible things—war, genocide, and slavery—have resulted
not from disobedience, but from obedience’’ (Zinn 1997/
2009, italics added).
Managers and Morality
Although not a primary focus of our special issue, managers
often emerge as central figures in discussions of workplace
ethics and morality as a personification of the organisation
itself, including its most unethical self. Consequently, some
discussion of prominent organisational members is war-
ranted, relative to morality, ethics and moral emotions. As
holders of offices in formal hierarchies, acting in line with
rules and regulations, and enforcing procedures and routi-
nes in an impersonal manner, managers in today’s organi-
sations can easily lose sight of ethical implications
regarding their actions. They may develop moral blindspots
prompted by bureaucracy and simply ‘‘doing their job’’.
Disciplining a recalcitrant individual or dismissing a
redundant employee reflect actions stripped of ethical
dimensions and become mechanical applications of proce-
dure. Jackall (1988/2010), who investigated in detail the
morality of managers at work, concluded that most of them
operate in an ethics-free zone of their own creation, where
morality is reduced to compliance with legal and profes-
sional regulations and to public relations. He argued further
that ‘‘the most salient aspect of morality as the managers
themselves see it [is] how their values and ethics appear in
the public eye’’ (p. 15).
The view of managers as essentially amoral agents of
organisations whose very function is to convert ethical
issues into technical ones is a centrepiece in the moral
philosophy of Alastair MacIntyre (2007). The manager, he
argued, ‘‘represents in his character the obliteration of the
distinction between manipulative and nonmanipulative
social relations… The manager treats ends as given, as
outside his scope; his concern is with effectiveness in
transforming raw materials into final products, unskilled
labour into skilled labour, investment into profits’’ (p. 30,
italics added). Management, according to this view, treats
people as resources to be deployed for the end of efficient
administration, free of moral considerations (see also
Ghoshal 2005). Conveniently, this renders moral and
political concerns invisible, turning them into issues of
technical efficiency. Practicing managers seek to control
people, information and other resources in the face of
continuous change and uncertainty. To this end, virtually
any concept or technique may be so marshalled.
MacIntyre (2007) regarded the manager as one of the
defining characters of our age—an age of what he viewed as
unprecedented moral confusion and ignorance. He argues
that we have lost faith in our ability to make rational argu-
ments about moral matters and base our judgments on purely
emotional hunches and whims. A picture of an animal in pain
will persuade us that animal experimentation is a bad thing;
later, a picture of a child whose life depends on a drug tested
on animals will persuade us to change our mind. This is what
he referred to as ‘emotivism’, or ‘‘the doctrine that all eval-
uative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments
are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of
attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character’’ (pp. 11–12, emphasis in original). The manager as
an archetype of this moral landscape is capable of speaking
the language of morality to attain technical aims, such as
funding for particular projects, but fails to grasp its true
meaning.
In sharp contrast, other scholars have effectively chal-
lenged the view of managers as morally indifferent or
ethically capricious. Watson’s (1994) and Fineman’s
(1998) ethnographic studies suggest that at least some
managers are neither moral illiterates nor immoral robots,
but fallible and at times confused agents seeking to
accommodate diverse demands, including ethical demands
made upon them. Having shadowed managers in a UK
telecommunications company for a whole year, Watson
empathetically concluded that ‘‘in spite of the existence of
pressures towards such a state of affairs identified by
Jackall, I believe that the majority of managers I worked
with at Ryland would be incapable of acting as amoral and
D. Lindebaum et al.
123
unfeeling agents of remote financial interests’’ (1994: 210,
emphasis added).
Leaders and Morality
The argument that managers’ actions are predominantly
instrumental and that efficiency often overshadows ethical
concerns continues to enjoy considerable currency. Nev-
ertheless, over the past 30 years, distinctions are regularly
made between management and leadership in organisa-
tions, necessitating a separate, brief discussion here
regarding ‘‘leaders’’ (Bass 1985; Burns 1978). While moral
qualities of managers are viewed as secondary to their
ability to run organisations efficiently, leaders, by contrast,
are seen as organisations’ moral agents—expected to dis-
play moral courage and rectitude, to lead by example, and
to personify the moral climate of their organisation or of
society at large (Ciulla et al. 2005). Nevertheless, moral
wrongdoing by leaders may undermine the morality of an
organisation and legitimise all kinds of infractions, as well
as undermine the legitimacy of the leaders themselves.
Thus, a lively debate is on-going as to whether leadership,
in its very essence, embodies assumptions of goodness,
integrity and virtue (Burns 1978; Ciulla 1998/2004; Ciulla
and Forsyth 2011), or whether this is a wish-fulfilling
illusion and leadership is essentially an amoral concept
(Bass 1999; Kellerman 2004). This debate, whose earlier
contributors include Plato, Machiavelli and Hobbes,
remains inconclusive. What is clear, however, is that fol-
lowers expect their leaders to behave ethically, whether the
latter do so or not.
Leaders are expected to treat their subordinates with
dignity and respect, acknowledging, if not always fulfilling,
their followers’ needs and aspirations. It is in this context
that theories of servant (Greenleaf 1977) and caring lead-
ership (Ciulla 2009; Gabriel 2015; Tomkins and Simpson
2015) developed, drawing sometimes on the emerging
philosophy and psychology centering upon the ethics of
care and compassion. The underlying concept of caring
here is not a generalised attitude, as in ‘‘I care about the
future of the planet’’ or ‘‘I care about the condition of
prisons’’, but a direct emotional engagement with people
for whom the leader feels directly responsible and whose
well-being he/she sees as a priority.
Organisations, with their impersonal and bureaucratic
attributes, are frequently seen as curtailing the ethic of care.
Yet, the expectation that leaders should care for the wider
good and not only for their personal enhancement or gratifi-
cation is widely accepted. This has drawn leadership theories
close to the study of emotions (Eisenbeiss and van Knippen-
berg 2015) and opens up the morality of leaders to a scrutiny of
the emotions that identify, support and respond to it.
Moral Emotions, (Un)ethical Actions and Morality
in Organisations
Previously, we argued that moral emotions provide pre-
liminary and crucial support for ethical action. This means
they often provide an instant appraisal of the ethical
standing of prominent organisational members (i.e. man-
agers and leaders), particular situations and/or colleagues’
actions, indicating whether they are ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘bad’’. For
example, moral anger has both informational (i.e. involving
and attribution of blame) and energic (i.e. motivational)
value, which jointly determine if, how, and by whom
restorative action may be taken, while providing the
impetus and motivation for undertaking such action (Lin-
debaum and Gabriel 2015). Symmetry often accompanies
our determinations of good and bad organisational policies,
practices and behaviour. When favourable assessments and
subsequent emotions occur, organisations and their agents
are seen as promoting justice, compassion and integrity in
the work environment. When an individual or situation are
negatively evaluated, however, moral emotions often
involve an attribution of blame (towards the self or oth-
ers—see Solomon 1993b; Walker and Jackson 2016).
Beyond this intuitive symmetry, however, are circum-
stances when profoundly moral emotions can lead to
unethical behaviour and support anti-social actions. This is
the position taken by Schwartz (1987), who argued that
many organisations today, far from relying on the moral
indifference of their members, seek to generate a zealot-
like commitment in them, by fuelling their narcissism. As
members of glamorous and powerful organisations, indi-
viduals can feel important and powerful, their lives being
full of meaning. Without the organisation, they feel lost,
deracinated and weak. Organisations encourage their
members to identify with them to a maximum extent, thus
creating relations of acute dependence. Many of their
members become organisational acolytes (Hopfl 1992),
working long hours and making many personal sacrifices in
the interest of the organisation, on whose grandeur and
success their own narcissism (and financial support) relies.
In this way, organisations can take over individuals’
moral emotions, turning them into triggers for anti-social
actions and unethical behaviours. An individual’s guilt,
argues Schwartz (1987), comes to be controlled by the
employer. Instead of feeling guilty for committing illegal
acts—such as concealing the truth, deceiving customers or
harming the environment—individuals are liable to feel
guilty for not protecting their organisation from external
scrutiny, not working hard enough, or even not being
ruthless enough in pursuit of their organisational duties.
There are further conditions under which moral emo-
tions can create moral blindspots, and, as a result, promote
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immoral and misguided action. Studies on social move-
ments show that ‘injustice frames’ are key to promoting
protest, depending upon ‘‘the righteous anger that puts fire
in the belly and iron in the soul’’ (Gamson 1992, p. 32).
However, experimental studies show that hostility to
authority preceded the development of such an injustice
frame when individuals were exposed to transgressions by
authoritative figures (Gamson et al. 1982). Therefore,
anger, suspicion or other emotions may be induced even
before blame is attributed—through more cognitive pro-
cesses—to another individual or group, leading to mis-
placed and misdirected blame. Such distortions generate
consequences where individuals ‘‘exaggerate the role of
human actors, failing to understand broader structural
constraints, and misdirect their anger at easy and inap-
propriate targets’’ (Gamson 1992, p. 33).
Thus, moral emotions by themselves offer no guarantee
of ethical behaviour, an issue that comes to the fore in the
behaviour of whistle-blowers, for instance. Are these
individuals deeply ethical human beings who, appalled at
organisational malpractices, decide to blow the whistle? Or
are they ethically crippled individuals who, disenchanted
with their employer or with life in general, decide to wreck
what is valuable and important to others by tarnishing their
organisation’s image and contaminating its brand (Alford
2001; Gabriel 2008b)? Clearly, both scenarios are possible,
which makes the relationship between moral emotion and
ethical behaviour potentially problematic. Our moral
impulse can sometimes lead us astray, for example, when
we scapegoat an individual or a group, holding them
responsible for our own failures or suffering, even when
they have nothing to do with it.
Rousing their followers’ passions in pursuit of oppor-
tunistic, selfish or downright immoral ends has long been
the trademark of demagogues and rabble-rousers. There is
ample evidence from political psychology confirming
Schwartz’s (1987) insight that moral emotions can, in the
right circumstances, lead to highly immoral actions, espe-
cially when people act as members of a crowd. Crowds are,
in general, known to have an unquestioned conviction of
their own morality and the immorality of their adversaries
(Freud 1921/1985; Le Bon 1885/1960), a phenomena
replicated in smaller settings under conditions of group-
think (Janis 1982). A cast iron conviction that one’s cause
is right while one’s adversary is wrong offers no guarantee
against skulduggery. Consequently, in certain circum-
stances, it could be argued that far from an enemy of
morality, organisation can be viewed as its defender.
Minimally, an organisation can serve as the defender of a
particular type of morality, one that emphasises equality,
transparency and proper allegiance to agreed procedures
and norms. This applies in as much as the organisation
seeks to tame individuals’ and groups’ propensities to act
impulsively and justify biased or blinded forms of action
by reinforcing consistent standards of treatment.
This is the forceful position adopted by Paul du Gay
(2000) in his book, In Praise of Bureaucracy, who argues
that, far from being the enemy of morality, bureaucracy
offers a defence against charismatic and pseudo-charis-
matic leaders who threaten morality by stirring moral
emotions in pursuit of devious ends. Offering a radically
different interpretation of the Nazi holocaust from Bauman
(1989), du Gay proposes that it was fanatical allegiance to
the Fu¨hrer rather than an impersonal allegiance to a bureau
(in the Weberian tradition) that sustained a project of
planning and launching wars of aggression, perpetrating
mass extermination and other crimes against humanity. Du
Gay’s view that genocide represents an instance of exag-
gerated zeal in applying a perverse morality is quite con-
sistent with the view of several contemporary historians
(Allen 2002; Bauer 2001; Finkelstein 2000; Friedla¨nder
1997; Goldhagen 1996), who have moved away from the
traditional view of the perpetrators of Nazi crimes as dull
bureaucrats blindly pursuing their ‘duties’ (Arendt 1963;
Bauman 1989; Hilberg 1985) and towards the view of them
as dedicated and even moralistic enthusiasts of a cause (for
an overview, see Stokes and Gabriel 2010).
Thus, we come full circle with our introductory essay.
From organisation as a neutraliser of moral emotions and a
disabler of individuals’ moral impulse to organisation as a
neutraliser of untamed passions and a guardian against
power abuses by individuals or a crowd mentality that can
always find good, moral reasons for doing the wrong thing.
In this special issue, contributing authors make compelling
arguments addressing these and other concerns highlighted
in our Call for Papers. We integrated these perspectives to
thematically organise our special issue.
Moral Emotions, Ethical Behaviour and Social
Pressure
Marie Dasborough and Paul Harvey (2016) contribute one
of the first empirical studies on Schadenfreude with a
workplace focus. Seemingly counterintuitive at first, the
authors argue that Schadenfreude, or pleasure derived from
another’s misfortune, is a moral emotion, given its disin-
terred elicitors (i.e. the self is not directly affected by it)
and pro-social action tendencies—both hallmarks of moral
emotions. Dasborough and Harvey agree that Schaden-
freude initially appears to have no pro-social action ten-
dency. However, once the lens of social functional
emotions is applied, they argue that Schadenfreude reflects
pro-social behaviours since shared emotions serve adaptive
functions in the coordination and maintenance of rela-
tionships among individuals, collectives and cultures.
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Emotions promote social learning and deter (e.g. in cases
of norm or value violations) or incentivise other individu-
als’ social behaviour. Schadenfreude sends a negative
signal to the observed person (e.g. a person committing
ethical transgressions) that such behaviour is not tolerated.
The two scenario, empirical studies by Dasborough and
Harvey shed light on relevant boundary conditions.
Specifically, in study 1, those experiencing Schadenfreude
intended to share that feeling with others, particularly if
they felt the misfortune of the unethical CEOs (scenarios
based upon factual news stories) was deserved. In study 2,
these authors extended their findings by adding targets of
Schadenfreude with different status (i.e. CEO vs.
employee). They found participants willing to share
Schadenfreude regarding targets of high status rather than
low status, especially when the perceived severity of the
target’s misconduct was low. However, the status effect
vanished with higher degrees of target transgression. In our
view, their studies significantly extend the social functional
account of Schadenfreude, insofar as its social sharing
conveys normative signals to others about behaviour at
work considered unethical or immoral. Thus, Schaden-
freude can function to deter potential moral transgressors.
Jagannathan and Rai (2016) examine in detail the ethical
issues raised by police killings of suspected terrorists in
India, euphemistically referred to as ‘police encounters’.
Against a background of ethnic tensions and terrorist out-
rage, the authors examine the roles of anger as an emotion
that both supports and justifies extra-judicial killings, but
also opposes and resists such justifications. The article
draws on one of the author’s first-hand experience as a
police officer and the testimony of another officer who
successfully tracked terrorist suspects, but refused to par-
ticipate in extra-judicial activities. By juxtaposing this
officer’s stories to those of other participants (including
journalists and fellow officers), the authors address one of
the oldest and most enduring issues in moral philosophy—
circumstances under which illegal means may be used for
an ostensibly greater good. They demonstrate how difficult
it is in conditions of crisis for moral anger to prevail against
‘‘blind anger’’ fuelled by anxiety and an inability to
acknowledge grief and engage in collective mourning.
Indirectly, the article examines how courage in the face of
formidable state power is sustained by the enduring moral
qualities of anger, when rooted in opposition to violence,
no matter the perpetrator. More directly, this piece suggests
that while blind anger is hostile to discussion and reason-
ing, moral anger is fundamentally dialogical—seeking to
establish coalitions of dissent to violence. Deprived of time
and space for dialogue and reasoning, however, moral
anger can become ineffectual and yield to other, more
primitive impulses.
Moral Emotions and Their Consequences Within/
Across Levels of Analysis
Walker and Jackson (2016) provide one of the first com-
prehensive reviews detailing the link between corporate
psychopathy and a range of moral emotions. This review
reflects a greater focus on psychopathy as an individual
difference variable (as opposed to structural influences) in
the corporate context. As the authors note, corporate psy-
chopaths are ‘‘subclinical psychopaths within an organi-
sational setting’’ that research suggests may prove
advantageous as they pursue individual rewards that allow
for significant advancement. But once they are at the top
(or presumably en route to it), they can wreak havoc—
overt and latent—in the organisation, from interpersonal
manipulations to large-scale fraud. After summarising
work examining the range of moral emotions, Walker and
Jackson review studies on psychopathy in relation to them.
These studies are organised around their functional quality
(i.e. is the signal positive or negative?) and the target of the
moral emotion (i.e. self-directed vs. other-directed). A
fundamental contribution of this review is to advance our
understanding of how moral emotions relate to psychopa-
thy. More precisely, the review suggests that psychopaths
are high in moral emotions associated with other-directed
negative signals (e.g. anger, contempt, scorn and envy). For
instance, the authors detail the example of a corporate
psychopath who displayed rage when his secretary, in his
view, disrespected him. He subsequently demanded of his
superior that she be fired. Further to this, the authors show
that psychopaths tend to be low in self-directed negative
signals (e.g. guilt, regret, remorse, or shame). In other
words, psychopaths seem less likely to experience shame
due to their low concern for social conventions and others.
Psychopaths are also low in other-directed positive signals
(e.g. awe or admiration), since this runs contrary to their
self-interest. The review did not ascertain any empirical
articles concerning psychopathy and self-directed positive
signals (as in the case of pride). However, indirect evidence
is offered suggesting corporate psychopaths can potentially
use pride as a type of ‘macho’ response to threats that help
restore their pride. A key practical implication is the need
to be sensitive to psychopaths who frequently signal others
to change their behaviour, but rarely change their own.
Detecting this pattern before promoting such individuals to
more senior positions may help prevent major crisis in the
organisation.
Murphy and Kiffin-Petersen (2016) significantly
advance our understanding of workplace shame—both in
terms of dispositional and organisational influences—
across levels of analysis. They provide a comprehensive
review of the topic and offer a conceptual model containing
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a set of testable propositions. The authors question why
unethical behaviour at work and society occurs ‘‘with
surprising regularity despite strong inhibitors and social
norms that emanate from personal and public shame’’. In
response to this, they extend previous works and incorpo-
rate dual pathways to theorise how felt and anticipated
shame shapes and affects ethical behaviour. While shame
qualifies as a moral emotion (Tangney et al. 2007), they
argue it can be more difficult for individuals to learn from
moral transgressions (even minor ones) in order to inform
their future behaviour. This is due to attributing failure to
the ‘global self’, coupled with the infrequency and intensity
of feeling shame. Consequently, the authors propose that a
potentially more important function of shame is invoking
an individual’s moral judgment, namely, illuminating their
evaluation of right and wrong. Their review also asserts
that shame’s impact on unethical workplace behaviour is
best comprehended by combining multiple levels of anal-
ysis. This, the authors underline, has been frequently
overlooked in the literature of shame at work. Finally,
Murphy and Kiffin-Petersen offer further explanations as to
why shame sometimes leads to adaptive reparative beha-
viour, while at other times, it induces further transgres-
sions. Overall, this piece will serve as a useful roadmap to
inform future research on shame in organisations across
levels of analysis.
Harvey, Martinko and Borkowski’s article (2016) exam-
ines how causal perceptions and moral emotions (i.e. anger,
shame and guilt) help justify deviant workplace behaviour.
Using Attribution Theory and Affective Events Theory to
frame this research, the authors argue that causal attributions
regarding negative workplace events generate unique emo-
tions which can, in turn, stimulate deviant behaviours. For
instance, following a negative workplace event, individuals
may attribute culpability to the employing organisation—
seen as a relatively stable, controllable factor. This generates
anger and resentment that may lead organisational members
to feel justified in subsequent deviant action (cf. also studies
on social movements mentioned earlier—Gamson 1992).
Relatedly, when undesirable, affective workplace events are
attributed to stable and personally uncontrollable factors,
shame results—with unique effects on deviance. The same
proves true when unfavourable work events are attributed to
stable (or unstable), personally controllable factors. Guilt
that results, for example, may inhibit or promote deviance.
Limited empirical assessment examining these emotion-
mediated relationships offers an empirical gap this two-study
project helps address. Although their hypotheses initially
argue all three emotions could promote ‘‘justified’’ deviant
behaviour, study results show a more complicated relation-
ship among emotions and deviance. Sample characteristics
(student versus physician), context (e.g. socialisation, ethical
standards and life experience) and the blending of moral
emotions appear to impact the strength and nature of the
‘attribution-emotion-behaviour’ (Weiner 1985) relation-
ships. These studies and their conclusions offer a strong
foundation from which future research can untangle (or
perhaps co-mingle) thought process and emotional reactions
arising from frustrating organisational encounters in an
effort to help minimise damaging workplace deviance.
Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the Management
of Moral Emotions
The topic of moral blindness returns in this article by De
Klerk (2016), who uses a psychoanalytic perspective to
investigate the unconscious defence mechanisms that fre-
quently result in people with high moral standards engag-
ing in morally questionable behaviours. Emotions,
including moral emotions, argues De Klerk, can be
unconscious and exercise a strong influence on people’s
behaviour without them being aware of their own motives.
An unconscious conflict between moral impulses and
potentially anti-social emotions such as greed, aggression
or envy can result in anxiety. This nervous response is then
fended off through a variety of defence mechanisms, like
projection, denial, repressions, rationalisation or idealisa-
tion. All these, in turn, lead to various distortions in peo-
ple’s sense of reality or perspective, including complete
‘blindness’ in the face of glaring moral wrongdoing. De
Klerk identifies four fundamental modes of dealing with
unconscious emotions including emotion avoidance, regu-
lation to mitigate emotion, failure to regulate emotion and
regulation to shield emotion—each contributing in its own
way to moral blindness. Recognising the role of uncon-
scious conflicts and impulses, De Klerk moves beyond the
view of moral blindness as ignorance and prompts us to
think of it as a motivated psychological process with
unpredictable outcomes.
Virtue and Moral Emotions
Karakas et al. (2016) develop a multi-dimensional frame-
work of moral imagination based on interviews with
executives in Turkish organisations. To stimulate imagi-
native thinking, they identify nine sets of virtues, each
corresponding to a particular root metaphor. The virtues are
integrity, affection, diligence, inspiration, wisdom, trust,
gratefulness, justice and harmony, while corresponding
metaphors include a well-oiled system, intimate family,
talent fest, art workshop, human brain, closely knit com-
munity, play-space, court room and round table. The pri-
mary data demonstrate a remarkable degree of moral
sophistication on the part of managers who participated in
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the study, including the sharp realisation of knotty prob-
lems that arise when virtues find themselves in conflict. In
addition to developing the theory of moral imagination, the
article shows how moral emotions underpin several core
virtues and, in the case of emotions like love, joy, hope and
compassion, constitute these virtues. Importantly, the arti-
cle offers a compelling account of a synthesis between an
Islamic ethic of hard work and spiritual values with a neo-
liberal ethic of innovation and entrepreneurship which aims
to harmonise individual well-being with a wider concern
for social well-being and justice.
Moral Emotions and Action Tendencies
Using interview and diary data, Linehan and O’Brien
(2016) seek to better understand recurring emotional and
ethical challenges faced by HR professionals. Their article
illuminates complicated, moral dilemmas these individuals
confront daily as they attempt to address the needs of
multiple organisational ‘others’, including individual (and
collective) employees and management. When faced, lit-
erally, with an employee requiring their attention, HR
professionals often feel conflicted determining what is ‘the
right thing to do’. Moral emotions arising from a sincere
concern for another’s well-being collide with motivations
to maintain professional detachment when conducting role-
prescribed responsibilities. Thus, emotion display rules
often serve to override or neutralise the moral impulses of
those tasked with supporting employee growth, engage-
ment and general welfare. This study highlights the rela-
tional and fluid nature of ethical awareness and decision-
making in HR practice. Linehan and O’Brien map the
processes HR professionals use as they enact their role and
rationalise their actions while simultaneously shifting
alliances between proximal and distal ‘others’. These
practices include determining employee culpability, sig-
nificance of consequences and rationalising emotional
appeals during interactions. For HR professionals, moral
emotions emerge as a ‘‘tell-tale sign’’ that ethical chal-
lenges will confront them as they decide on—and live
with—a chosen course of action. This research clearly
articulates the often daily ethical struggles of HR practi-
tioners while providing conceptual insights into critical
outcome variables including employee burnout, commit-
ment and retention.
Finally, Wilner et al. (2016) examine what happens
when the ‘unmanaged organisation’ (Gabriel 1995) moves
beyond its physical confines and into social media. Internet
and social media use especially have created new avenues
for expressing dissent. These omnipresent forums allow
employees to publicise organisational malpractices and
voice opposition to their employing organisation and its
brand, products and promoted practices. The internet opens
up new opportunities for parrhesia or ‘speaking truth to
power’. At the same time, however, it affords every fanatic,
malcontent and narcissist opportunities to express unchal-
lenged opinions and views. Under the protection of anon-
ymity, social media can become a space for denunciations
characteristic of terror regimes. The authors analyse certain
instances when images and texts were published online,
escaping organisational controls. These often emerge in
specialist sites that encourage participants to voice criti-
cisms of their employer. Out of fifty cases considered in
this study, only three came close to Foucault’s (2001) view
of parrhesia as ‘fearless speech’. The analysis of online
resistance and dissent enabled these authors to identify
three core ambiguities: ambiguity between private and
public spheres, ambiguity between spontaneous and per-
formed manifestations and ambiguity between the distri-
bution and control of power. Each of these ambiguities can
enhance the scope and effectiveness of online dissent;
nevertheless, they can also neutralise, eviscerate or dis-
credit it. As a democratised space for self-expression, the
internet and social media emerge as highly contested ter-
rains where different interests and claims compete for
ascendancy and where successes and failure can be short-
lived. Yet, concurring with Mestrovic (1996), these authors
express deep unease regarding the venting of emotions in
social media, questioning whether emotions behind the
abundant outpourings of sentiment on the web, can main-
tain their moral compass and provide a firm guide to action.
Beyond this Special Issue—Future Research
In this section, we revisit and draw out potential explana-
tions as to why serious ethical transgressions continue to
emerge. In our view, seeking to explain what factors or
constructs may influence each other is a necessary but
insufficient condition to explain why or how these occur a
priori. As some contributions in this special issue suggest,
it may be the inability to experience moral emotions, such
as shame or guilt, that foster unethical or immoral actions
at work (Murphy and Kiffin-Petersen 2016; Walker and
Jackson 2016). In this respect, we recognise—with clear
caveats—two potential avenues for future research to
explain why or how, for instance, individuals possess or
develop an inability to experience moral emotions. At the
individual level, the first path lies in the emerging literature
on the neuroscience of ethical decision-making. These
studies are interested in, for instance, better understanding
the neural mechanisms that influence ethical decision-
making in relation to a range of relevant issues, such as
trust, altruism, fairness, revenge, social punishment, social
norm conformity, social learning and competition (Rilling
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and Sanfey 2011). Nevertheless, scholars must consider the
limitations of putatively more objective and rigorous neu-
roscientific data prior to attempting to build new theory
(Lindebaum 2016; Niven and Boorman 2016). Further,
scholars should recognise that any such exploration might
raise ethical questions in itself (Lindebaum and Rafto-
poulou 2015), and that there are unresolved theoretical/
philosophical challenges in bridging the biological and
social domains (Lindebaum and Zundel 2013).
Second, we propose a fresh look at more structural con-
siderations in better understanding the inability or reduced
likelihood to experience moral emotions or, equally impor-
tant, the presence of amoral emotions (e.g. greed, envy,
jealousy, etc.) and their origins and articulation in organi-
sational settings. This appears important, as both the pres-
ence of amoral emotions and the absence of moral ones have
bearing upon our ability to regulate selfishness and make
social life possible (Haidt 2008). In particular, we propose re-
visiting Durkheim’s (1893/2014) idea on the division of
labour, which, if orchestrated appropriately, need not
threaten the moral cohesion of society. But, as Durkheim
cautions, if the division of labour is excessively pushed,
individuals risk becoming isolated as a result of the spe-
cialised task, to the point that this separation becomes ‘‘a
source of disintegration’’ (p. 280) for both the individual and
society. Crucially, he adds that individuals ‘‘no longer [will
be] aware of the collaborators who work at [their] side on the
same task… [they] even no longer [have] any idea of what
that common task comprises’’ (p. 280). Durkheim used the
term ‘anomie’, meaning a lack of moral regulation, to
describe the ‘pathological’ consequences of an overly spe-
cialised division of labour. We suggest that anomie may
prove a fruitful starting point to better understand the
emergence and articulation of amoral emotions—as indi-
cated before—in organisational settings and society. Con-
sistent with our introductory reflections, it is noteworthy that
Durkheim’s writings in the late 19th century anticipated that
the notion of the ‘common task’ may be threatened in the
future. What is the consequence of this in times of increasing
social divisions, inequality and even terrorism?
Finally, probing the morality of leaders and the influence
of emotions in this continues to be a vitally important line of
inquiry. Moral emotions play a dominant role in public
debates as manifested by continuous slurs and insults being
traded between candidates in the current American presi-
dential primaries. These entail attempts to shame opponents
for different aspects of their past record, attempts that easily
backfire by calling into question the ethical judgement of the
one launching the moral invective. Future research may take
a closer look at the mere appearance of leader morality and
the risks associated with seeking to occupy a moral high
ground by questionable means.
Conclusion
The articles in this special issue responded in insightful and
provocative ways to our goal of deepening the understanding
of moral emotions’ roles in organisations as part of wider
discourses on organisational ethics and morality. Using a
multitude of theoretical angles and methods, they signifi-
cantly advance our theoretical and practical insights on the
nexus among emotions, ethics and the world of organisa-
tions. We hope that researchers and practitioners will find
some inspiration in this collection of articles to improve our
theorising and approach to organisational practice around
issues of moral emotions and ethical behaviour.
Acknowledgments We extend our heartfelt gratitude to all authors
who considered our special issue as potential outlet for their work,
although only some articles survived the review process. A very
special ‘thank you’ goes to the excellent and reliable reviewers, who
supported us along the way. We recognise that their reviews—de-
livered in a timely fashion—were instrumental in completing this
special issue.
Funding This study has not received any funding.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Conflict of interest All authors declare that they have no conflict of
interest.
Ethical Approval This article does not contain any studies with
human participants performed by any of the authors.
References
Ahrne, G., & Brunsson, N. (2010). Organization outside organiza-
tions: the significance of partial organization. Organization.
doi:10.1177/1350508410376256.
Alford, C. F. (2001). Whistleblowers: broken lives and organizational
power. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Allen, M. T. (2002). The business of genocide: The SS, slave labor,
and the concentration camps. Chapel Hill, NC: University of
North Carolina Press.
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality
of evil. New York: Viking Press.
Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and performance beyond expecta-
tions. New York: Free Press.
Bass, B. M. (1999). Two decades of research and development in
transformational leadership. European Journal of Work and
Organizational Psychology, 8(1), 9–32.
Bauer, Y. (2001). Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Bauman, Z. (1989). Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Brown, A. D., Gabriel, Y., & Gherardi, S. (2009). Storytelling and
change: An unfolding story. Organization 16(3), 323–333.
doi:10.1177/1350508409102298.
Burns, J. (1978). Leadership. New York: Harper & Row.
Ciulla, J. B. (Ed.) (1998/2004). Ethics, the heart of leadership.
Westport, CT: Praeger.
D. Lindebaum et al.
123
Ciulla, J. B. (2009). Leadership and the ethics of care. Journal of
Business Ethics 88(1), 3–4. doi:10.1007/s10551-009-0105-1.
Ciulla, J. B., & Forsyth, D. R. (2011). Leadership ethics. In A.
Bryman, D. Collinson, K. Grint, B. Jackson, & M. Uhl-Bien
(Eds.), The SAGE handbook of leadership (pp. 229–241).
London: Sage.
Ciulla, J. B., Price, T. L., & Murphy, S. E. (Eds.). (2005). The quest
for moral leaders: Essays on leadership ethics. Northhampton,
MA: Edward Elgar.
Dasborough, M., & Harvey, P. (2016). Schadenfreude: The (not so)
Secret Joy of Another’s Misfortune. Journal of Business Ethics.
doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3060-7.
de Klerk, J. J. (2016). Nobody is as blind as those who cannot bear to
see: Psychoanalytic perspectives on the management of emotions
and moral blindness. Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/
s10551-016-3114-x.
du Gay, P. (2000). Praise of bureaucracy. London: Sage.
Durkheim, E. (1893/2014). The division of labor in society. New
York: Free Press.
Eisenbeiss, S. A., & van Knippenberg, D. (2015). On ethical
leadership impact: The role of follower mindfulness and moral
emotions. Journal of Organizational Behavior 36(2), 182–195.
doi:10.1002/job.1968.
Elfenbein, H. A. (2007). Emotion in organizations: A review and
theoretical integration. The Academy of Management Annals
1(1), 315–386. doi:10.1080/078559812.
Fineman, S. (Ed.). (1993). Emotion in organizations. London: Sage.
Fineman, S. (1998). Street-level bureaucrats and the social construc-
tion of environmental control. Organization Studies, 19(6),
953–974.
Finkelstein, N. G. (2000). The Holocaust industry: Reflections on the
exploitation of Jewish suffering. London: Verso.
Fotaki, M. (2015). Why and how is compassion necessary to provide
good quality healthcare? International Journal of Health Policy
and Management, 4(4), 199–201.
Foucault, M., & Pearson, J. (2001). Fearless speech. Los Angeles,
Ca.: Semiotext(e): Distributed by MIT Press.
Freud, S. (1921/1985). Group psychology and the analysis of the ego
Civilization, Society and Religion (Vol. 12, pp. 91–178). Har-
mondsworth: Pelican Freud Library.
Friedla¨nder, S. (1997). Nazi Germany and the Jews: The years of
persecution 1933–1939 (1st ed.). New York: HarperCollins.
Frost, P. J., Dutton, J. E., Worline, M. C., & Wilson, A. (2000).
Narratives of compassion in organizations. In S. Fineman (Ed.),
Emotion in organizations (2nd ed., pp. 25–45). London: Sage.
Gabriel, Y. (1995). The unmanaged organization: Stories, fantasies
and subjectivity. Organization Studies, 16(3), 477–501.
Gabriel, Y. (2008a). Latte capitalism and late capitalism: Reflections
on fantasy and care as part of the service triangle. In M.
Korczynski & C. MacDonald (Eds.), Service work: Critical
perspectives (pp. 175–190). London: Routledge.
Gabriel, Y. (2008b). Spectacles of resistance and resistance of
spectacles. Management Communication Quarterly, 21(3),
310–327.
Gabriel, Y. (2015). The caring leader—What followers expect of their
leaders and why? Leadership 11(3), 316–334. doi:10.1177/
1742715014532482.
Gamson, W. A. (1992). Talking politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Gamson, W. A., Fireman, B., & Rytina, S. (1982). Encounters with
unjust authority. Homewood, IL: Dorsey.
Geddes, D., & Callister, R. R. (2007). Crossing the line(s): A dual
threshold model of anger in organizations. Academy of Man-
agement Review, 32(3), 721–746.
Geddes, D., & Stickney, L. T. (2011). The trouble with sanctions:
Organizational responses to deviant anger displays at work.
Human Relations 64(2), 201–230. doi:10.1177/
0018726710375482.
Ghoshal, S. (2005). Bad management theories are destroying good
management practices. Academy of Management Learning and
Education, 4(1), 75–91.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice: Psychological theory and
women’s development. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press.
Goldhagen, D. J. (1996). Hitler’s willing executioners: Ordinary
Germans and the Holocaust (1st ed.). New York: Knopf.
Gray, H. M., Ishii, K., & Ambady, N. (2011). Misery loves company:
When sadness increases the desire for social connectedness.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 37(11), 1438–1448.
doi:10.1177/0146167211420167.
Greenleaf, R. K. (1977). Servant leadership : A journey into the
nature of legitimate power and greatness. New York: Paulist
Press.
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K.
R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective
sciences (pp. 852–870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Haidt, J. (2008). Morality. Perspectives on Psychological Science
3(1), 65–72. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6916.2008.00063.x.
Harvey, P., Martinko, M. J., & Borkowski, N. (2016). Justifying
deviant behavior: The role of attributions and moral emotions.
Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3046-5.
Hilberg, R. (1985). The destruction of the European Jews (Rev. and
definitive ed.). New York: Holmes & Meier.
Hochschild, A. R. (1983). The managed heart: The commercialization
of human feeling. Berkely, CA: University of California Press.
Holt, R., & den Hond, F. (2013). Sapere aude. Organization Studies,
34(11), 1587–1600.
Hopfl, H. (1992). The making of the corporate acolyte: some thoughts
on charismatic leadership and the reality of organizational
commitment. Journal of Management Studies 29(1), 23–33.
doi:10.1111/j.1467-6486.1992.tb00650.x.
Inglis, F. (2015). Thoughts unbecoming. Times Higher Education,
pp. 44–47.
Jackall, R. (1988/2010). Mazes: The world of corporate managers.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Jagannathan, S., & Rai, R. (2016). Organizational wrongs, moral
anger and the temporality of crisis. Journal of Business Ethics.
doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3153-3.
Janis, I. L. (1982). Groupthink: psychological studies of policy
decisions and fiascoes (2nd ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Karakas, F., Sarigollu, E., & Uygur, S. (2016). Exploring the diversity
of virtues through the lens of moral imagination: A qualitative
inquiry into organizational virtues in the Turkish context.
Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3150-6.
Kellerman, B. (2004). Leadership warts and all. Harvard Business
Review, 82(1), 40–45.
Le Bon, G. (1885/1960). The crowd: A study of the popular mind.
New York: The Viking Press.
Lindebaum, D. (2012). I Rebel—Therefore we exist: Emotional
standardization in organizations and the emotionally intelligent
individual. Journal of Management Inquiry 21(3), 262–277.
doi:10.1177/1056492611430125.
Lindebaum, D. (2016). Critical essay: Building new management
theories on sound data?. The case of neuroscience. Human
Relations 69(3), 537–550. doi:10.1177/0018726715599831.
Lindebaum, D., & Gabriel, Y. (2015). Anger and organization
studies—From social disorder to moral order. Organization
Studies. http://oss.sagepub.com/content/early/2016/04/13/01708
40616640848.full.
Lindebaum, D., & Geddes, D. (2015). The place and role of (moral)
anger in organizational behavior studies. Journal of Organiza-
tional Behavior. doi:10.1002/job.2065.
Moral Emotions and Ethics in Organisations: Introduction to the Special Issue
123
Lindebaum, D., & Jordan, J. P. (2014). When it can be good to feel
bad and bad to feel good: Exploring asymmetries in workplace
emotional outcomes. Human Relations, 67(9), 1037–1050.
Lindebaum, D., & Raftopoulou, C. E. (2015). What would John Stuart
Mill say? A utilitarian perspective on contemporary neuro-
science debates in leadership. Journal of Business Ethics.
Lindebaum, D., & Zundel, M. (2013). Not quite a revolution:
Scrutinizing organizational neuroscience in leadership studies.
Human Relations 66(6), 857–877. doi:10.1177/0018726
713482151.
Linehan, C., & O’Brien, E. (2016). From tell-tale signs to irrecon-
cilable struggles: The value of emotion in exploring the ethical
dilemmas of human resource professionals. Journal of Business
Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3040-y.
Macintyre, A. (2007). After virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame.
Mestrovic, S. (1996). Postemotional society. London: Sage.
Mill, J. S. (1861/2001). Utilitarianism. London: Electric Book Co.
Murphy, S. A., & Kiffin-Petersen, S. (2016). The exposed self: A
multilevel model of shame and ethical behavior. Journal of
Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3185-8.
Niven, K., & Boorman, L. (2016). Assumptions beyond the science:
Encouraging cautious conclusions about functional magnetic
resonance imaging research on organizational behavior. Journal
of Organizational Behavior. doi:10.1002/job.2097.
Rilling, J. K., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011). The neuroscience of social
decision-making. Annual Review of Psychology 62(1), 23–48.
doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.121208.131647.
Rynes, S. L., Bartunek, J. M., Dutton, J. E., & Margolis, J. D. (2012).
Care and compassion through an organizational lens: Opening up
new possibilities. Academy of Management Review 37(4),
503–523. doi:10.5465/amr.2012.0124.
Schwartz, H. S. (1987). Anti-social actions of committed organiza-
tional participants: An existential psychoanalytic perspective.
Organization Studies, 8(4), 327–340.
Solomon, R. (1993a). Ethics: A short Introduction. Dubuque, IA:
Brown & Benchmark.
Solomon, R. (1993b). The passions: Emotions and the meaning of life.
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
Solomon, R. (2007). Introduction to ethics. In W. C. Zimmerli, K.
Richter, & M. Holzinger (Eds.), Corporate ethics and corporate
governance (pp. 11–36). Heidelberg: Springer.
Stickney, L. T., & Geddes, D. (2016). More than just ‘‘Blowing off
Steam’’: The roles of anger and advocacy in promoting positive
outcomes at work. Negotiation and Conflict Management
Research 9(2), 141–157. doi:10.1111/ncmr.12071.
Stokes, P., & Gabriel, Y. (2010). Engaging with genocide: The
challenge for organization and management studies. Organiza-
tion 17(4), 461–480. doi:10.1177/1350508409353198.
Suddaby, R. (2010). Editor’s comments: Construct clarity in theories
of management and organization. Academy of Management
Review, 35(3), 346–357.
Tangney, J. P., et al. (2007). Moral emotions and moral behavior.
Annual Review of Psychology 58, 345–372.
Tomkins, L., & Eatough, V. (2014). Stop ‘helping’ me! Identity,
recognition and agency in the nexus of work and care.
Organization 21(1), 3–21. doi:10.1177/1350508412461293.
Tomkins, L., & Simpson, P. (2015). Caring leadership: A heidegge-
rian perspective. Organization Studies 36(8), 1013–1031. doi:10.
1177/0170840615580008.
Walker, B. R., & Jackson, C. J. (2016). Moral emotions and corporate
psychopathy: A review. Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/
s10551-016-3038-5.
Watson, T. J. (1994). In search of management: Culture, chaos and
control in managerial work. London: Routledge.
Wilner, A., Christopoulos, T. P., & Alves, M. A. (2016). The online
unmanaged organization: control and resistance in a space with
blurred boundaries. Journal of Business Ethics. doi:10.1007/
s10551-016-3184-9.
Zajonc, R. B. (1980). Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no
inferences. American Psychologist 35(2), 151–175. doi:10.1037/
0003-066x.35.2.151.
Zinn, H. (1997/2009). The Zinn reader: Writings on disobedience and
democracy. New York: Seven Stories Press.
D. Lindebaum et al.
123
